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Introduction 
Extraordinary capacity as a technician is a necessary but not 
sufficient basis on which to claim the designation of expert. The 
differentiating aspect is what separates an art from a science, what 
is learned during apprenticeship as opposed to what can be taught 
to a student. Within any given field, the technician shares with the 
expert mastery of the individual objects in terms of which the field 
itself is defined. T he mastery of the expert, however, is also in-
formed by an awareness of the differences produced by variations 
in the ways those objects are perceived, by what is often referred 
to as style, rather than substance. What follows is a study in style, 
and it is assumed th at readers are acquainted with the substance of 
the judicial opinions being analyzed. T he attempt is to demonstrate 
that such mastery is the begi nning, rather than the culmination, of 
the endeavor of understanding. 
By providing the link between rationale and result that distin-
guishes law from fiat, the judicial opinion represents the difference 
between justice and power. As a consequence, how an opinion is 
written is important for what it tells the reader about what the law 
is perceived to be, just as, for the litigator, it is important for the 
information it communicates about the perspective being brought 
to bear on the controversy being described. JudiciaL style, in short, 
is a matter too human in scope to be left to connoisseurs of opinion 
writing. 
The Opinion 
The specific matters under discussion in this article are the im-
port of the formulation of the issue addressed in the Fogel v. Chest-
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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nutt1 opinion as the need, "more than four years after the First 
Circuit decided Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1971), reversing 
316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), concerning the duty of the 
managers of a mutual fund to recapture brokerage commissions 
for the benefit of the fund ... [to] determine whether we agree with 
the First Circuit's decision ... " 2 and the significance of the fact 
that so much of the opinion, in terms both of what was described 
and what was stressed,3 is devoted to the activities of an adminis-
trative agency. 
The Basis of Liability 
After two sections devoted to administrative developments and 
one to describing the proceedings in the district court, Section IV 
of the opinion addresses the issue of "the basis of liability." After 
noting that "the obligations entailed by the contract theory might 
well be more severe than those entailed by the theory of breach of 
fiduciary duty," 4 the opinion rejects the former theory-"that [re-
capture] efforts were required by F und's certificate of incorpora-
tion" 5-on this basis: 
"Although the argument is not without force, we think it presses 
too far. The term 'net asset value' is one of art in the mutual 
fund industry and is elaborately defined in the certificate of in-
corporation. The objective of the charter provision was to pre-
vent dilution of per share net asset value by the issuance of new 
shares at a discount; defendants' failure to recapture part of the 
commissions on portfolio transactions does not result in such 
dilution. Plaintiffs' real complaint is not that new shareholders 
did not pay net asset value but that the Adviser, for selfish mo-
tives, refrained from handling portfolio transactions in a manner 
that would have diverted a portion of the commissions to itself, 
with an attendant decrease in the advisory fee-in substance a 
1 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975). 
2 /d. at 734. 
3 "Before analyzing the legal issues it wi ll be convenient to update the dis-
cussion of administrative developments in Part I of this opinion .. .. " /d. 
at 739. 
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charge of breach of a fiduciary duty resulting in corporate 
waste." 6 
. The writer of the opinion had demonstrated a similar regard for, 
and emphasis on, what he perceived to be the realities of the busi-
ness world and the impact of judicial opinions on that world in 
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates/ where the legal question at issue 
-the validity of a specific contractual provision-produced three 
opinions on the question of how the judiciary could determine 
whether a given bloc of securities "controlled" the corporation: 
"Attractive as [Judge Lumbard's] proposal is in some respects, 
I find difficulties with it. One is that I discern no sufficient in-
timation of the distinction in the New York cases, or even in the 
writers, who either would go further in voiding such a clause . . . 
or believe the courts have not yet gone that far. . . . To strike 
down such a condition only in cases falling short of the suggested 
line accomplishes little to prevent what I consider the evil; in 
most instances a seller will not enter into a contract conditioned 
on his 'delivering' a majority of the directors unless he has good 
reason to think he can do that. When an issue does arise, the 
'practical certainty' test is difficult to apply. The existence of such 
certainty will depend not merely on the proportion of the stock 
held by the seller but on many other factors-whether the other 
stock is widely or closely held , how much of it is in 'street names,' 
what success the corporation has experienced, how far its div-
idend policies have satisfied its stockholders, the identity of the 
purchasers, the presence or absence of cumulative voting, and 
many others. Often, unless the seller has nearly 50% of the 
stock, whether he has 'working control' can be determined only 
by an election; groups who thought they had such control have 
experienced unpleasant surprises in recent years." 8 
Equally noteworthy, however, is the extent to which the pro-
posed solution focuses on requirements which, given the stress on 
the view that "developments over the past decades seem . .. to show 
that such a [contractual] clause violates basic principles of corpo-
6/d. at 744-745. 
7 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). 
8/d. at 580, 582. 
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rate democracy," 9 could fairly be described as technical: 
"To hold the seller for delinquencies of the new directors only 
if he knew the purchaser was an intending looter is not a suffi-
cient sanction. The difficulties of proof are formidable even if 
receipt of too high a premium creates a presumption of such 
knowledge, and, all too often, the doors are locked only after the 
horses have been stolen. Stronger medicines are needed-re-
fusal to enforce a contract with such a clause, even though this 
confers an unwarranted benefit on a defaulter, and continuing 
responsibility of the former directors for negligence of the new 
ones until an election has been held. Such prophylactics are not 
contraindicated, as Judge L umbard suggests, by the conceded de-
sirability of preventing the dead hand of a former 'controlling' 
group from continuing to dominate the board after a sale, or of 
protecting a would-be purchaser from finding himself without a 
majority of the board after he has spent his money. A special 
meeting of stockholders to replace a board may always be called, 
and there could be no objection to making the closing of a pur-
chase contingent on the results of such an election. I perceive 
some of the difficulties of mechanics such a precedure presents, 
but I have enough confidence in the ingenuity of the corporate 
bar to believe these would be surmounted." 10 
Since the contractual basis for the liability of mutual fund di-
rectors has been accepted by the Moses court, 11 the Fogel opinion 
notes that "a comment on Moses raises the question why, if this 
theory were sound, the court went on with an extensive discussion 
... of management's duty to make full disclosure to the unaffiliated 
directors and the apparent resting of liability upon that ground." 12 
The Fogel Standard 
The Fogel opinion begins its analysis of the theory of breach of 
fiduciary duty by noting that it takes "a less expansive view" 13 
9/d. at 581. 
10 I d. 
11 "A similar argument, made by the same counsel, was accepted in Moses 
v. Burgin." Note 1 supra, at 744. 
12 /d . 





1977] FOGEL v. CHESTNUTT 379 
of the section of the Investment Company Act, "as originally en-
acted," 14 on which the Moses court predicated federal jurisdiction 
and whose standards it "seemingly also held" 15 had been violated. 
The standard the Fogel opinion applies it finds to entail "a duty 
which [a] 1970 amendment makes explicit." 16 It agrees with the 
Moses court, however, that "under the scheme of the Investment 
Company Act an investment adviser is 'under a duty of full dis-
closure of information to ... unaffiliated directors in every area 
where there was even a possible conflict of interest between their 
interests and the interests of the fund'-a situation which occurs 
much more frequently in the relations between a mutual fund and 
its investment adviser than in ordinary business corporations .... " 17 
The basis for liability thus adumbrated raises, of course, the con-
siderable issue of the extent to which a legal duty can legitimately 
be held to govern acts occurring before it was made explicit. Given 
the focus of thi s article on the use of the Moses precedent, how-
ever, and the stress of the Fogel opinion on the varying impacts of 
different legal theories, 18 it seems more relevant that a Southern 
District of New York opinion, 19 rendered five months prior to 
Fogel, noted that "the Burgin formulation has not been adopted in 
this circuit," 20 and that "in view of the developments since Burgin 
one can be certain that whatever doubts might exist as to whether 
its basic thrust was non-disclosure, rather than a mandate that re-
gional exchanges be utilized to secure 'give-ups' for reduction of 
management fee, there is little doubt in my mind that non-disclosure 
is the only precedential value that Burgin now retains." 21 
After reviewing the testimony given in the trial court, the Fogel 
opinion concludes that "this does not add up to the effective com-
munication of a problem to the independent directors mandated by 





18 See text at note 4 supra. 
19 Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 389 F . Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
20 /d. at 950. 
21 Id. at 950-951. 
22 Note 1 supra, at 749. 
380 SECURITIES REGUlATION LAW JO URNAL [VOL. 4 : 375 
case direct suggestions from the staff of the SEC such as those dis-
cussed in Moses." 23 
Given that the Fogel opinion resulted in a reversal of the result 
reached by the district court, it seems significant that it concluded 
its review of administrative developments with "the Securities Act 
Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat. 97, which, of course, were not 
available to [the district court]." 24 Again, given the focus of this 
article, the significance of the reference to the 197 5 Amendments is 
less the specific bench mark is provides in connection with the issue· 
~f making legal duties retroactive25 than the extent to which it high-
lights .an appellate c~urt's use of administrative activities to justify 
reversmg the conclusiOns reached by a trial court. Thus, in Moses 
Judge Wyzanski's opinion was such that the F irst Circuit explicit!; 
noted: 
"We are urged at length by defendants, in common with most 
appellees who come before us with findings in their favor, that 
we have no power to review the evidence de novo. We recognize 
this, and strive not to do so. This is not to say, however, that we 
cannot reverse findings wh ich are unsupported by the evidence 
or which are so contrary to the great weight of the evidence a~ 
to compel the conclusion that a manifest error has been done 
and in such circumstances make the opposite finding. Nor do~ 
23/d. 
24/d. at 743 (footnote omitted). 
25 
"A recent amendment, Section 6, Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 
(Pub. L. 94-29), to the securities law would appear now to bar Eberstadt 
f:~m any invol~ement in the portfolio transactions of the Fund. The plain-
tiff properly pomts out that the new amendment applies only after May 1, 
1978, and does not affect defendants' liability prior thereto. This, of 
couse, is true. Moses v. Burgin, viewed in the light of the amendment and 
the n~odific.ation in SEC app~oach between 1966 and the present to the 
questiOn ra~sed here, must be mterpreted to accord with decisions holding 
that a requt.rement of ful l disclosure and lack of misrepresentation encap-
su lates the tmpact of the federal securities laws. Moreover, the new law 
undergirds the flooring on which the court's view is based that the Fund 
poli~y under attack is clearly an exercise of sound business judgment and 
out~tde th~ re.ach of the jurisdiction of this court. In summary, I find no 
basis for liability under either the federal securities law or the common 
law." 
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it mean, where no finding has been made at all, that we cannot 
make our own finding, provided that the great weight of the 
evidence would compel such a conclusion." 26 
Moreover, the importance of the "direct suggestions from the 
staff of the SEC" 27 stems from the fact that, in Moses: 
"The district court found untrue plaintiff's claim that Manage-
ment 'consistently kept from the directors any of the informa-
tion which might have aroused them from their inaction.' This 
finding is supportable only in the sense that the concealment was 
not 'consistent.' In any other sense it is plainly erroneous as to 
NASD recapture in the light of the knowledge Management con-
cededly possessed which could well have aroused the unaffil-
iated directors. As will be developed, the inescapable fact is 
that Management defendants did, for an extended period of time, 
keep to themselves possibly, we would say probably, stimulating 
information." 28 
Given this history, the Moses precedent may represent simply a 
declaration that the power possessed by trial courts as finders of 
fact29 is necessarily limited by the power of appellate courts as 
declarers of law. Viewed in this light, the Fogel opinion is a polit-
ical document, whose focus is the activities of federal trial and 
appellate judges. Without denying that the judicial opinions can 
validly be viewed as political documents, however, it must be 
26Moses v. Burgin, 445 F .2d 369,373 n.6 (1st Cir. 1971). 
27 See text at note 23 supra. 
28 Moses v. Burgin, note 26 supra, at 377. 
29 See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 383 F. Supp. 914, 919, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1974): 
"Under the theory of the case for plaintiffs, it is necessary for them to 
show that Fund or Adviser could have formed a subsidiary which could 
have properly become a member of NASD. 
"Counsel for defendants ignore this issue and offer no help to the Court. 
* 
"The principle is accepted that defendants were under a duty by all proper 
means to secure for Fund the return of excess brokerage commissions. 
It is not shown that defendants could have properly secured any return 
for Fund." 
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noted that the audience to which they are addressed is wider than 
the federal judiciary. 
The Fogel Opinion and the Business World 
The Fogel opinion demonstrated sensitivity to this wider au-
dience, to the impact of its determination on the business world, 
when, "in remanding to the district court for the determination of 
damages," 30 it noted: 
"The Moses result may appear somewhat harsh, particularly in 
a case like this involving a medium-sized no-load fund where 
there were stronger business reasons against seeking recapture, at 
least for the period when reciprocals or give-ups to brokers in 
return for sales efforts were in vogue. However, we think the 
considerations against allowing defendants to attempt to prove 
that, after independent investigation by the disinterested di-
rectors, the board might reasonably have concluded not to re-
capture, or at least not to go all out for recapture, . .. similarly 
foreclose defendants with respect to damages, as long ·as damages 
are limited to the business as actually conducted." 3 1 
The corporate law decision which could function as the prec-
edential basis for the distinction between breach of duty and liability 
for damages by a corporate director is the Learned Hand opinion 
in Barnes v. Andrews,32 in which it was held that although the 
court "cannot acquit Andrews of misprison in his office . .. " 33 
"the plaintiff must accept the burden of showing that the perfor-
mance of the defendant's duties would have avoided loss, and what 
loss it would have avoided." 34 
The ultimate rationale for this holding was delineated by Hand 
five years later in an address to the American Law Institute : 
"For many ages, for thousands of years indeed, mankind lived 
along without being able to change at all the traditional codes 
30 /d. at 755. 
31 /d. at 756 (footnote omitted). 
32 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 





1977] FOGEL v. CHESTNUTT 383 
which regulated the details of their lives. Custom had the sanc-
tion of the gods and being divine, men feared to meddle with it. 
In civilized times we have indeed acquired that power and it is 
upon it that we must rely if we are to say that we are governed by 
our common consent. In one way or another we set up officials 
who innovate, and when they do, we call it our common will at 
work. This we have made the cornerstone of our structure. Our 
common law is the stock instance of a combination of custom 
and its successive adaptations. The judges receive it and profess 
to treat it as authoritative, while they gently mould it the better 
to fit changed ideas. Indeed, the whole of it has been fabricated 
in this way like a coral reef, of the symmetry of whose eventual 
structure the artificers have no intimation as they labor." 35 
The consequences of this view of the judicial function became 
clear in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures of 1958, in which 
Hand concluded: 
"I have tried to strike a balance between the advantages of our 
own system and one in which we might en joy at least the protec-
tion of judges against our frailties. To me it seems better to take 
our chances that such constitutional restraints as already exist 
may not sufficiently arrest the recklessness of popular assem-
blies." 36 
Further, he found that "it is as craftsmen that we [judges] get our 
satisfactions and our pay." 37 
In contradistinction to this viewpoint, the Fogel opinion utilized 
the skill of the craftsman precisely to avoid being governed by the 
fact that "prior to December 5, 1968, it was common practice, cus-
tom and usage for a mutual fund through its manager to direct 
executing brokers on the NYSE and other national securities ex-
changes to 'give up' part of their commission to other exchange 
members who had no part in the execution of the transaction." 38 
It must be noted, however, that in the Charles Evans Hughes 
35 Hand, "Is T here a Common Will?" 28 Mich. L. Rev. 46,49-50 (1929) . 
36 Hand, The Bill of Rights 74 (1964). 
37 /d. at 77. 
38Tannenbaum v. Zeller, note 19 supra, at 945,947 (footnote omitted). 
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Lecture of March 21, 1963, which took as its text Lord Devlin's 
sentence that "the work done by the Judges of England is not now 
as glorious as it was," Judge Friendly noted: 
"[T]he legislature's superior resources for fact gathering; its 
ability to act without awaiting an adventitious concatenation of 
the determined party, the right set of facts, the persuasive lawyer, 
and the perceptive court; its power to frame pragmatic rules de-
parting from strict logic, and to fashio n a broad new regime or 
to bring new facts within an existing one; its practice of changing 
law solely for the future in contrast to the general judicial re-
luctance so to proceed; and, finally, the greater assurance that a 
legislative solution is not likely to run counter to the popular will : 
all these give the legislature a position of decided advantage, if 
only it will use it." J9 
As a result : 
"I .. . do not at all lament the diminished role of the judge 
vis-a-vis the legislator as a maker of law. What I do lament is 
that the legislator has diminished the role of the judge by oc-
cupying vast fields and then has failed to keep them ploughed .. . . 
"My criticism is directed rather at cases in which the legislature 
has said enough to deprive the judges of power to make law even 
in such subordinate respects but has given them guidance that 
is defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way 
of remedy when the problem comes to light. " 40 
In terms of the law applied to the mutual fund directors whose 
actions were the subject of the Fogel opinion, it seems clear that 
the detailed provisions of the Investment Company Act41 and the 
ongoing efforts of the SEC to regulate the activities of ·the mutual 
fund industry42 have considerably constricted the scope of the 
area governed by a single judicial decision. Given the substance 
39 Friendly, "The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislatures 
Who Won't," 63 Colo. L. Rev. 787, 791-792 (1963). 
40 I d. at 792. 
41 See text at notes 13, 14 supra. 
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of Fogel, in short, the distinction between the technician and the 
expert has become a narrow one. 
As to the meaning of this narrowing in terms of the vision of 
law held by our society, it seems to me significant that Judge 
Wyzanski concluded his 1963 Introduction to the 1958 Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Lectures in the following terms: 
"Judges who daily exercise constitutional power exercise more 
latitude in cases of statutory construction and of common law 
rules than do judges whose experience lies in more conventional 
professional paths . And yet, completely to follow Judge Hand's 
teachings and to take his strict canons of judicial review, would 
open, at the present stage in our history, possibilities of political 
tyranny of far greater dimensions than anything within the scope 
of judicial caprice. 
"Unless I am mistaken, the people of the United States have con-
sciously chosen to adhere to the institution of judicial review 
because they enjoy a larger measure of democracy within its 
framework than they would without it. And so long as there are 
judges with the skepticism, tolerance, and humility of Judge 
Hand to remind us how cautiously judges should proceed, this 
popular delegation to the judiciary is not likely to be revoked." 43 
The Substance of Fogel v. Chestnutt 
This section of the article attempts to delineate the sense in which 
· the following holding of Fogel v. Chestnutt embodies the dangers 
inherent in the narrowing of the vision of law held by our society: 
"We therefore conclude that liability exists with respect to the 
Adviser and the defendants Chestnutt, Sabel and G reene. Under 
the principle laid down in Moses, .. . we would see no basis for 
imposing liability on directors who were not interested. . . . 
While we do not rule on the apportionment of liability, equity 
would suggest the imposition of primary responsibility on the 
Adviser, which profited from the fa ilure to recapture." 44 
43 Hand, note 36 supra, at xiv. 
-44 Note 1 supra, at 750. 
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In terms of the world in which directors are active, what is re-
markable about this holding is that it is precisely the unaffiliated 
directors who are intended to represent the interests of the fund 
shareholders free from the conflicts of interest inheren t in the role 
of the adviser.45 In terms of corporate law precedents, the imposi-
tion of liability solely upon interested directors could be supported 
by the citation of Meinhard v. Salmon,46 in which Cardozo ex-
plicitly noted that "Meinhard, who had given money, but neither 
time nor labor, had already been richly paid," 47 and that "there 
might seem to be something grasping in his insistence upon more," 48 
but held, in the paragraph that is regularly cited as the justification 
for the imposition of a fiduciary duty: 
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for 
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties . A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the 
rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of par-
ticular exceptions. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for 
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the 
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of 
this court." 49 
45 See also id. at 749-750, including n.l8: 
"The minimum requirement to enable the Fund's independent directors 
to discharge these duties with respect to recapture was a careful investi-
gation of the possibilities performed with an eye eager to discern them 
rather than shut against them, and, if these possibilities were found to be 
real, a weighing of their legal difficulties and their economic pros and cons. 
It would have been still better to have the investigation of recapture meth-
ods and their legal consequences performed by disinterested counsel fur-
nished to the independent directors. This was done in Moses but the 
court found that counsel had not been sufficiently informed." 
46 249 N.Y. 45, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
47/d. at 468, 164 N.E. at 548. 
48/d. 
49/d. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546. 
l ! • 
t 
j 
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Salmon, however, was a case that dealt with a partnership and 
a real estate lease, and in this sense, a demonstration of the prob-
lem raised by the constriction of the area governed by a judicial 
· opinion, the possibility that "the work done by [common-law judges] 
is not now as glorious as it was," 50 is that Salmon is not perceived 
as a decision whose significance is governed by those facts. As 
to the relevance of Salmon to Fogel v. Chestnutt, it was Judge 
Friendly, in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, who lamented the fact 
that "here we are forced to decide a question of New York law, 
of enormous to all New York corporations and their stockholders, 
on which there is hardly enough New York authority for a really 
informed prediction what the New York Court of Appeals would 
decide on the facts here presented ... yet too much for us to have 
the freedom used to good effect in Perlman v. Feldmann." 51 
The transaction held violative of fiduciary duty in Perlman, how-
ever, was the very same transaction under scrutiny in a suit that 
was dismissed because no violation of federal securities legislation 
could be demonstrated, and "jurisdiction in this case is not pred-
icated upon diversity of citizenship," 52 despite these allegations: 
"Feldmann violated Rule X-1 OB-5 when he reported by letter 
to Newport stockholders about the negotiations with Follansbee 
but failed to disclose his personal interest in its rejection. In 
addition, there are allegations that Feldmann and the other di-
rectors resigned pursuant to the terms of the sale to Wilport; and 
that Wilport, a corporation owned by ten large users of steel, was 
using, and intending to use, Newport as a 'captive' subsidiary. 
Plaintiffs ask that all defendants, save Newport, be directed to 
account, that defendants Wilport, Gibson, Mericka, Mitchell, 
Cobourn and Paxton, directors and officers of Wilport, be en-
joined from causing Newport to sell exclusively to Wilport; and 
that the sale of Feldmann's stock be declared void." 53 
The corporate law precedent holding valid what is, in a sense, 
so See text at note 39 supra. 
51 305F.2d 572,580 (2d Cir. 1962). 
52 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. , 98 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N .Y. 
1951) ; see also text at note 15 supra. 
53 I d. 
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the paradigm of directorial fiduciary duty-action even in the face 
of explicit action to the contrary by a majority shareholder interest 
-was rendered by the Court of Appeal of England in 1906 and 
involved a transaction perceived as involving violations of duties 
strikingly similar to those implicitly underlying the Birnbaum allega-
tions: 
"The plaintiff A.H. McDiarmid, who was the holder of 1,202 
shares in the pl;untiff company, being desirous that the assets and 
undertaking of the plaintiff company should be sold, arranged 
terms on behalf of the company for the sale of them to a new 
company formed for the purpose of acquiring them, and had 
these terms embodied in a contract which was engrossed ready 
for execution by the company." 54 
"Practically the whole of the 1,502 votes were given in respect 
of shares held by the plaintiff McDiarmid or his friends . 
"The directors, being of opinion that it would not be in the in-
terests of the plaintiff company that the contract should be 
carried out, declined to comply with the resolution." 55 
54 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cunningham, [1906] 
2 Ch. 34, 36. 
55/d. 
FANCY BOUGHT MONEY 
"I maintain that the Money Market is as concrete and real as anything 
else; that it can be described in plain words; that it is the writer's fault if 
what he says is not clear." 
-Walter Bagehot ( 1873) 
